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In this chapter we put projects at the centre stage of firms' activities – i.e. product and process innovation, strategy formulation and implementation, capability building and learning, organizational structure and design, and systems integration (the capability to combine diverse knowledge bases and physical components into functioning systems). Based on the findings of a 10-year research programme into firms producing high-value capital goods – known as complex products and systems (CoPS) – we draw out conceptual insights about project organizing that can inform and contribute to the development and reformulation of more universally applicable formal theories of strategic management and organization.

The glitter of techtransfer agreements often tends to be a camouflage and the number of trainees is no substitute for genuine techtransfer: the self‐sustained duplication of foreign technology. We study techtransfer in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore to develop the ethos of successful IT techtransfer. (1) Taiwan: In 1976 a US technology company, RCA, transferred CMOS technology which is foundational to semiconductors, not to a private company in Taiwan, but a public government agency. RCA could not trust Taiwan to honor Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) because of its piracy image. At home, RCA was accustomed to America's respect of its public institutions to do the honorable thing. So, RCA opted for a private‐to‐public techtransfer. Even after 16 years, another private company would not trust Taiwan private sector; General Physics of Columbia, Maryland, would transfer nuclear reactor simulation technology not to a private company, but to a government support organization, Institute for Information Industry. (2) South Korea: In the mid‐60s, US firms (Motorola, Signetics, Fairchild) began to assemble chips, followed by Japanese firms and 27 Japanese‐Korean Joint ventures (Samsung‐Sanyo; Crown Radio; Toshiba and Goldstar‐Alps Electronics). In 1975, Samsung acquired the only locally‐owned chip company (Korea Semiconductor) which manu‐factured CMOS chips for watches. (We recall that Taiwan imported CMOS technology from RCA in 1976). During 1983–84 Samsung ac‐quired DRAM technology and the ethnic Korean and Chinese employees succeeded in producing 64 and 256 k‐bit chips. CEO Lee took significant risks, time and again, to let Samsung join the race to design and manufacture successive generations of semiconductor technology. Much of the cumulative US$800 million investment in semiconductors was recouped in 1987 with the market upturn, and higher prices for 256 k‐bit chips. From 1989 onwards, Samsung pushed ahead to achieve design leadership by aggressively involving engineers in all phases of technology transfer and application, as well as by forging new joint ventures with foreign industry leaders which gave Samsung a more dominant role. 3. Singapore: Contrary to the leapfrogging advanced in the litera‐ture since 1982, suggesting that NICs leap over technology generations, Singapore electronics industry supports a model of incremental learning under which TNCs [Trans‐National Corporations] transferred technology gradually. Much of the advance was in pre‐electronic activities such as mechanical, electro‐mechanical and precision engineering, rather than in software or R&D, as would be expected under leapfrogging. As the subsidiaries advanced technologically, they formed forward links with customers, and backward links with local suppliers of capital goods. The government built up the appropriate infrastructure. We develop three Desiderata (desired conditions) for techtransfer: (1) A Pre‐determined Sequence of Technology by Type and Level, (2) A Pre‐determined Sequence of Intellectual Property Rights Protection, and (3) A Pre‐determined Sequence of Upgrading of Transferee's Technical Skills. Why should the transferor engage in any techtransfer? Because leading US corporations use only about 5 percent of their process inventions (Rank 100, 99,…,96) to improve/invent products. To protect the market of these five products, process inventions with Ranks 95, 94,…, 1 have to be denied to competition; they have to be literally locked up. If any NIC is at technology level say, 15, techtransfer of technology level 45 would instantaneously increase the transferee's technology level by (45–15÷15 =) 200% with no risks of R&D, no investment in facilities, no investment in personnel. That transfer would not threaten the transferor's latest products embodying Ranks 100, 99,…, 96. However, it would threaten the transferor's products embodying Rank 45. New technology leadtime is 6–18 months. If the transferee stays out of the main markets of the transferor (e.g. USA, Europe) for that leadtime, the transferee can sell in say, Asia and the Middle East, Africa and Australia. The transferee could offer the transferor two types of revenue: (1) licensing fee which is usually about 1–3% of gross revenue generated from products which could not have been produced without the transferred technology; and (2) 1% of revenue from new markets created by the technology. If the transferee observes the letter and the spirit of techtransfer for six months, a higher level technology, say level 60 could be transferred, instantly raising the transferee's technology level by (60–15÷15 =) 300%. This pre‐determined sequence of techtransfer is a win‐win situation. The transferor receives revenue from what is currently frozen assets; the transferee systematically raises its level of technology by 200%, 300%, etc. without having to risk a single dollar on uncertain R&D.

Andreas Al-Laham has been holding the chair for strategic and international management at the University of Mannheim since September 2009. After his studies of economics and business administration at the Technical University of Dortmund he received his PhD (1996) and Habilitation (2000) degree at the same University, Faculty of Business Administration, Chair of Strategic and International Management. From 2000 to 2002 he worked as a visiting research scholar and visiting professor for strategic management and organizational theory at the J.L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Canada. Afterward he became professor of international management and business policy at the University of Stuttgart. In 2004 he took a professorship of strategic management at the CASS Business School, City University of London, UK. Up till today, he is visiting professor for General Management and International Strategy. Between 2006 and 2009 he held the chair for management and international strategy at the University of Kaiserslautern. He has written several books, for example! Strategisches Management. Theoretische Grundlagen-Prozesse-Implementierung (together with M. K. Welge), Organisationales Wissensmanagement. Vahlens Handbücher der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaft, Praxis des strategischen Managements (together with M. K. Welge and P. Kajüter) and Strategieprozesse in deutschen Unternehmungen. His current research focuses on evolutionary dynamics in the German biotech-industry, alliances and network dynamics as well as the internationalization of SME.

The Korean Government wishes to transform the nation into a Northeast Asian business hub. Following economic crisis, there are attempts to move the economy towards a new market‐oriented paradigm of economic growth based on foreign direct investment (FDI) and market friendly transparent corporate governance, replacing the old model of the developmental state, involving intimate and opaque business‐government relations, which has dominated Korean policy for at least three decades. This paper presents findings from 37 interviews conducted with senior executives of foreign companies and various chambers of commerce in Korea. The paper offers new insights into the critical and often invisible issues which need to be confronted and successfully resolved for the transformation of Korea. In providing a critical analysis, the paper examines alternative interpretations of the hub concept, key advantages offered by Korea, the main barriers to becoming a hub, competition from other locations and draws lessons for government policy makers.

In the era of dramatic developments in technology worldwide, the relative competitiveness of a corporation/country over time has to be continuously calibrated and pro‐actively protected. Here, for the first time, we develop two sufficient conditions, and 12 necessary conditions of continuous competitiveness (CC): the ratio of value‐added per unit of currency of OUR product (service) to THEIR product (service). In Chapter 1, we apply CC to three corporations (IBM, CEC, API) and to three countries (Japan, Taiwan, Korea). At a time when IBM enjoyed 80 percent of the market, it decided to commit 83 percent of the next four years' TOTAL SALES to build a new generation of computers on the unproven technology of integrated circuits to assure IBM's continuous competitiveness. To the same end, Japan pro‐actively selected the growth industry of each decade beginning in the '50s (computers), and nurtured it, taxing other industries. The first year in which the US trade with the Pacific exceeded that of the Atlantic, 1982, is the benchmark of a study of competitiveness of two countries of comparable population and exports, Korea and Taiwan. If Taiwan exports rose in volume but lost in profitability, Taiwan needs to make better products cheaper and faster. If the required technology advances are not fully available domestically, they need to be imported: Which is the rationale of technology transfer (techtransfer). Techtransfer can meet one of the necessary conditions of CC, viz., the desired technological progression‐from linear extensions of performance characteristics along the same curve, to quantum jumps from one technology curve to another. The techtransfer over two decades from IBM‐Taiwan to Taiwan Manufacturers as a whole progressed from components to complete product: Which could be considered at best as linear extensions of performance characteristics. For a country like Taiwan, whose trade (i.e. exports + imports) is as much as 94.8% of GNP, and which does not have a highly developed R&D base, techtransfer is a prime means of upgrading the technology. We will examine two Taiwan corporations which expanded exports through techtransfer: one, a Taiwan components manufacturer; and two, a Taiwan power supply manufacturer. As vendors to IBM, they aggressively pursued techtransfer from IBM. These empirical applications set the stage to examine Malaysian experience of E&E in Chapter 2.

The paper analyses how public buyers transition from procuring single products and services to procuring complex performance (PCP). The aim is to examine the change in the interactions between buyer and supplier, the emergence of value co-creation and the capability development during the transition process.

A multiple, longitudinal case study method is used to examine the transition towards PCP. The study deploys rich qualitative data sets by combining semi-structured interviews, focus group meetings and organisational reports and documents.

The transition towards PCP can be best described as a learning process which cumulates the knowledge and experience in the client-supplier interaction accompanied by changing contractual and relational capabilities. In public infrastructure this process is not initially motivated by the benefits of value co-creation, but is politically driven.

The study proposes three generic transition stages towards increased performance and infrastructural complexity moderated by contract duration. These stages may help managers of public agencies to identify the current procurement level and the contractual and relational challenges they need to master when facing higher levels of performance and infrastructural complexity.

The study adds to the limited empirical and conceptual understanding on the nature of long-term public-private interactions in PCP. It contributes through a rare focus adopting a longitudinal perspective on these interactions in the transition towards PCP.

This chapter clarifies our understanding of the project-based firm (PBF) by sharpening the theoretical foundations of project capabilities. It emphasizes the differences between project capabilities that eliminate variance in project outcomes (to control costs and add value) and economies of scale that reduce costs across multiple projects. It also highlights how the different ways in which value is captured by project-based organizations can feedback to influence how these capabilities and scale economies are generated. This opens up new typologies of project-based organizations, with implications for theory and practice.

Traditional innovation typologies within the extant literature are not compatible with the innovation levels found within the Australian outdoor hospitality parks (OHP) sector, given its tourism and small business characteristics. This paper seeks to introduce an innovation typology specific to the Australian OHP sector.

A two‐phase qualitative research method was employed, whereby 30 semi‐structured interviews were conducted with OHP operators/administrators who were identified as being “innovative” by four industry executives. Based on the 30 interviews carried out in Phase 1, six industry individuals who demonstrated a wider and deeper approach to innovation than the others were further interviewed in Phase 2.

A small percentage of Australian OHP industry operators and executive officers showcase a level of innovation that is beyond incremental in character, but is not radical, revolutionary or disruptive. This group of “strategic innovators” are the first to adopt ideas from other sources and adapt them to fit within the Australian context. These new ideas are introduced in three‐ to four‐year increments, providing the individuals with sufficient time to assess the market's reaction to the changes, and to measure increased value to their situation. The three‐ to four‐year time span dovetails with the length of time taken by the majority of competitors to imitate the new concepts.

The paper introduces an innovation typology applicable to the Australian outdoor hospitality parks sector.